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  Special education litigation has grown rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s 
following the passage in 1975 of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
and judges have become more involved in determining whether or not students with 
disabilities are receiving a free and appropriate public education. We argue that students 
with disabilities are a minority interest and promoting their interests can make state 
judges unpopular for two reasons: first, IDEA imposes substantial costs on state and local 
budgets; second, IDEA mainstreams children with disabilities into regular classrooms.  
We then provide evidence at the state and school district level that those states that either 
did not elect judges or eliminated judicial elections have more aggressively promoted the 
interests of students with disabilities. The most compelling explanation for this finding is 
that judges who do not stand for election are more likely to promote minority interests.  
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   1
I. Introduction 
 
Courts in the United States started have been involved in education issues since 
the early 1970s.  In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez (1973)
1 the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that a system of financing public education that allowed for greater funding 
for affluent school districts did not violate the Equal Protection Clause.  In the wake of 
Rodriguez, some state courts interpreted their state constitutions to require equal funding.  
Thus, Rodriguez shifted the primary forum for these disputes from federal court to state 
courts.  Several scholars have examined how state court decisions have influenced the 
equity of school finance (e.g., Minori and Sugarman 1999; Evans, Murray, and Schwab 
1997; Card and Payne 2002, Figlio, Husted, and Kenny 2004). 
What has largely been ignored in the literature on courts and education policy, 
however, is that following the enactment and implementation of the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by the federal government in 1975 there has been an 
explosion of special education litigation in both federal and state courts (e.g., Huefner 
1991; Zirkel 1997).  Huefner reports that between 1977 and 1990, several hundred cases 
were filed in both state and federal courts.  Moreover, the amount of cases has not 
dwindled with time.  Newcomer and Zirkel (1999, 470) find that “the 613 published court 
decisions in the 1990s represent almost a tenfold increase from the total in the 1970s.”    
The IDEA was designed to protect the rights of a minority interest, namely 
children that had traditionally been excluded from public schools because of mental or 
physical disabilities.  These children were largely denied a “free and appropriate” public 
education and had in many cases been kept at home or placed in substandard institutions 
(e.g. Yell, 1998, chapter 4).  Under the IDEA, children with disabilities are entitled to an 
                                                 
1 411 U.S. 1.   2
individual education program (IEP).  “Under IDEA, a child who is referred for evaluation 
undergoes comprehensive individual testing to determine whether he or she has a 
disability eligible for special education and related support services” (Jasper 2004, 28).  If 
the child qualifies, an IEP must be developed for the child and this IEP must be reviewed 
annually.  Under law, “the IEP must be developed by a team of knowledgeable persons, 
including the child’s teacher; the parents, subject to certain limited exceptions; the child, 
if deemed appropriate; an agency representative who is qualified to provide or supervise 
the provision of special education; and other individuals at the parents’ or agency’s 
discretion” (Jasper 2004, 28).  If the parents or a school district disagrees with the IEP, 
they can petition for a “due process” hearing that can eventually go to either a state or 
federal court.   
IDEA has not been a popular policy at the state and local level for two reasons.  
First, it has meant that many disabled children have been “mainstreamed” into classes 
with children who do not suffer disabilities.  Parents of non-disabled children and schools 
have complained that these children can be disruptive (e.g., Neas 1998).  Moreover, many 
of these children take a great deal more resources than other children because they 
require extra attention and (sometimes) special equipment.  For example, “In 1977 
services for disabled students accounted for 16.6 percent of total education spending.  
Today the $78.3 billion spent on special education students at the local state, and federal 
levels accounts for 21.4 percent of the $360.2 billion spent on elementary and secondary 
public education …” (Crane and Boaz 2003, 307).  Second, IDEA is a federal mandate to 
the states that imposes a substantial burden on state and local budgets.  While the federal 
government has given money to states in support of this act, the money has not been   3
sufficient to cover all the costs of implementing IDEA (National Education Association 
2002; Rotherman 2002).  Thus, the states have been left to make up the difference, and 
subnational governments have to devote resources to compliance that they may want to 
utilize elsewhere. 
State court judges have been under pressure to ensure that students with 
disabilities receive programming in public elementary and secondary school following 
the passage of the IDEA by Congress in 1975 (and modified as recently as 2004).  This 
law “requires public schools to make available to all eligible children with disabilities a 
free appropriate public education in the least restrictive environment appropriate to their 
individual needs” (U.S. Department of Justice 2005).   Whether or not states (and 
schools) are in compliance is ultimately a judicial question, and state courts have been 
forced to make rulings on this topic.
2   
 In this paper we draw the connection between state judges and the 
implementation of the IDEA and, in so doing, draw lessons about procedures that 
encourage judges to protect minority interests. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
most states in the United States used elections for selecting and retaining their high level 
judges.  By the end of the century, however, many states moved to either elections with 
merit systems or appointment systems.  Hanssen (2004) argues that this shift reflects 
learning by political reformers that the election of judges, while originally intended to 
promote judicial independence, in fact had the opposite effect.  One reason for this is that 
                                                 
2 This is true even though IDEA is a federal law, and thus one might think the cases would go to federal 
court, as opposed to state court.  According to the U.S. Department of Justice (2005), “If parents disagree 
with the proposed IEP [Individualized Education Programs], they can request a due process hearing and a 
review from the State educational agency if applicable in that state.  They also can appeal the State agency's 
decision to State or Federal court.” The criterion that federal and state courts use to check whether and IEP 
provides a free and appropriate public education was decided in the U.S. Supreme Court case, Board of 
Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley (1982). We discuss this decision later 
in the paper.   4
judges that must stand for election or run for re-election are captured by political groups 
that raise money for their campaigns (Becker and Reddick 2003; American Bar 
Association 2003).  Another reason is that judges who are elected have a strong incentive 
to make populist decisions that will help them get reelected. These populist decisions 
include being lax in enforcing constitutional restrictions on deficit finance, deciding to 
have hearings for public utility dispute cases, siding with labor plaintiffs in cases 
involving employment discrimination charges, and pandering to the electorate in death 
penalty rulings (Hall 1995; Bohn and Inman 1996; Hanssen 1999; Besley and Payne 
2003). 
While it is well documented that elections can encourage judges to make populist 
decisions, there is no study that asks whether the elimination of elections is associated 
with the protection of minority interests.
3  The period from 1976-2000 when the IDEA 
was implemented is a useful case because five of the 48 continental states eliminated 
elections for their court of last resort judges, while 19 states had elections and 24 states 
had an appointment system throughout this period.
4 Thus, there is substantial cross-
sectional and time series variation that enables us to make statistical connections between 
elections and the (minority) interests of children with disabilities.  
In principle, a judge that is not elected is more likely to defend minority interests 
because he/she does not have to worry about alienating the broad electorate or an 
important campaign financier.  This argument, however, does not necessarily hold 
                                                 
3 It would be interesting to know whether unelected judges in the South were more likely to implement 
civil rights laws that protected the interests of Blacks. 
4 We focus on the election procedures for the Court of Last Resort judges, because that is the highest court 
in each state and any IEP case may, after an appropriate appeal and invitation, go to this court. However, in 
general most cases that go through the state system start at the trial level, so we also account for whether or 
not these judges are elected in our study.  We focus on the 48 continental states because Alaska and Hawaii 
came into the Union in the mid-twentieth century, and so much of the history of judicial policy that we 
discuss does not apply to them.   5
because some judges only care about their judicial legacy and do not pander to public 
opinion (Maskin and Tirole 2004).  Other judges may be motivated by the decision to 
make the “right” decision; that is, a decision that is consistent with the law or the 
constitution and that builds up their reputation for competence (e.g., Baum 1997).  
Moreover, judges who do not worry about standing for re-election still must worry about 
pandering to the group that oversees their reappointment, whether that is the state 
legislature or the governor.  For example, while high-level Japanese judges during 1955-
93 were appointed by the Cabinet and were rarely removed and were never elected out of 
office, judges who made rulings that pandered to the ruling LDP party were more likely 
to be promoted and to receive favorable job assignments (see Ramseyer 1994).  
  In the next section, we review the IDEA legislation as well as the cases that arise 
under this in the judicial system.  In Section III, we argue that removing elections is 
supposed to promote judicial independence, but this does not necessarily mean that 
judges promote minority interests.  Section IV describes our data and tests whether 
eliminating elections is associated with additional enrollments of students with 
disabilities at the state level, and also checks whether the elimination of elections is 
associated with more individual education plans at the school district level. We find 
substantial evidence that the absence and elimination of elections matters, and we find 
that this explanation holds up against many alternatives, including whether the state 
government is pro-education, the state courts are pro-education, the state government is 
pro-welfare programs, lawyers are more important than judges, political competition is a 
more fundamental measure of independence than elections, and that individual education   6
plans for the IDEA are allocated primarily to eliminate poverty rather than deal with 
disabilities. Section VI concludes. 
 
II. The IDEA and State Judges 
  Thus far, we have discussed the election of state judges and the protection of 
minority interests under the IDEA, but have not yet linked the two.  In fact, the linkage 
between the two is not obvious.  However, as we will show, state courts are key actors in 
the resolution of IEP disputes. 
  Once an IEP has been developed, if parents are unsatisfied with the plan, they 
have the right to “request a due process hearing and review by the state educational 
department” (Jasper 2004, 29).  This hearing is often conducted in front of a judge or 
trained lawyer who specialize in these types of cases.
5  Complaints tend to be the 
exception, rather than the norm.  Suchey and Huefner (1998) report that from 1992-1994, 
the number of complaints filed per student served was minimal—less than 0.1% on 
average.
6  That being said, the total number of complaints can number in the hundreds, 
and there was an average increase of 29% from 1992 to 1994 in the 23 states that 
reported figures (Suchey and Huefner 1998).  For example, in Pennsylvania, according to 
the Office of Dispute Resolution in the Department of Education, there were 209 cases 
that went to a hearing officer in the 2003-04 school year, and 248 in the 2004-05 school 
year. 
                                                 
5 Some states, like Arkansas and New York, also offer a mediation option that interested parties can try 
before proceeding to a hearing officer. 
6 Suchey and Huefner (1998) also report than educators file only a small percentage of complaints; most are 
filed by parents.   7
  Once these out-of-court remedies are exhausted, parents or school districts have 
the option to go to either a state or a federal court (Jasper 2004).  The point of entry for 
most of these cases are trial courts.  Once a case enters the judicial system, it follows the 
same path as other judicial cases.  A litigant dissatisfied with the decision by a trial court 
can appeal to a state (or federal) appellate court.  From there, the case can go to a state 
court of last resort.  Most of these courts have discretionary jurisdiction, so appeal to 
them (unlike intermediate appellate courts) is not automatic.
7  If the judges decide not to 
hear a case, then the decision of the lower court stands. 
Even though the judges are interpreting a statute, they do have some discretion.  
First, the extent to which judges should limit their inquiry to the record that was 
established in the due process hearing is unclear.  Judges have the ability to bring in new 
evidence, rather than limiting their decision to the existing evidence (Krahmal, Zirkel, 
and Kirk 2004).  Second, IDEA requires all children with disabilities to have access to a 
“free and appropriate public education.”  In Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson 
Central School District v. Rowley (1982)
8, the U.S. Supreme Court held that as long as 
overall academic progress is being made in the classroom, this is sufficient to satisfy 
IDEA (Huefner 2000).  Yet, judges have a lot of leeway in determining what exactly 
constitutes a “free and appropriate” public education.  Some courts have concluded that 
the progress must be meaningful and not just trivial; others have simply looked to see 
whether the IEP was “reasonably calculated” to provide benefit (Huefner 2000).  Even 
though the IDEA is a federal statute, it is easy to see how the state judges who hear these 
                                                 
7 In states where there is no intermediate appellate court, the court of last resort does not have discretionary 
jurisdiction.  Thus, regardless of the state, dissatisfied litigants have a right to appeal. 
8 478 U.S. 176.   8
cases have wide discretion in hearing evidence and in determining whether a particular 
IEP satisfies the criterion of being free and appropriate public education. 
 
III. Judicial Independence, Elections and Minority Interests 
  One of the most contentious issues surrounding state courts deals with the issue of 
judicial independence.  Definitionally, “judicial independence relies on the idea that 
judges are not subject to the influence of some other actor(s); they are the authors of their 
own decisions” (Kornhauser 2002, 48).  While it is true that no one method of retention 
(or selection) truly provides for independence
9, it is the case that appointed systems better 
insulate judges from reprisals from the public.
10  In state supreme courts, judges are 
retained in a variety of ways:  appointment by the governor, appointment by the 
legislature, victory in a merit (retention) election, victory in a partisan election, and 
victory in a nonpartisan election.  While the precise details of each retention scheme are 
not relevant here, it is the case that two of the methods of retention subject judges to 
electoral vulnerability:  partisan elections and nonpartisan elections.  Indeed, Bonneau 
(2005) shows that incumbent judges were more likely to be defeated in their bids for 
election than incumbent members of the U.S. House and Senate.  Not only are these 
judges at risk for electoral defeat, but they are also aware of this fact.  Scholars have 
                                                 
9 Here, we look at method of retention as opposed to method of selection.  The reason we make this choice 
is because what is important for our purposes is the manner in which judges are able to retain their offices 
and not the method by which they initially obtain them.  Of course, the relationship between formal method 
of selection and method of retention is quite strong—only Illinois, New Mexico, and Pennsylvania have 
differences in our data. 
10 As several studies of the U.S. Supreme Court have shown (Mishler and Sheehan 1993; McGuire and 
Stimson 2004), the justices are somewhat receptive to public opinion, even though they are appointed for 
lifetime terms of office.  However, what is important here is the degree to which judges may be held 
accountable for their decisions.  The more insulated the judge, the more independent she will be, and thus 
we expect judges who are retained by appointments to be more independent than judges who must face the 
electorate to retain their jobs.   9
demonstrated that judges who are up for election are more likely to change their voting 
behavior to make it more in line with their constituents as opposed to their own personal 
policy preferences (Hall 1995; Brace and Hall 1997).  In contrast, no such evidence has 
been found with either appointed schemes or with merit retention (where judges are 
subject to a vote before the electorate, but they are unopposed and voters are simply 
asked whether a judge should be retained).  Between 1990-2000, only 3 of 177 judges 
who stood for merit retention were defeated (Bonneau 2004). 
  Numerous scholars and public officials, including some judges themselves 
(Glaberson 2000; Davidson 2001; Phillips 2002), have publicly opposed the election of 
judges.  Moreover, calls for reform have permeated the media in states where judges are 
elected (Bell 2001; Dickerson 2001; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 2001; Glaberson 2001).  
Calls for reform, though they have become louder and more widespread, are not new.  As 
early as 1906, the renowned legal scholar Roscoe Pound in his address to the American 
Bar Association argued that “putting courts into politics, and compelling judges to 
become politicians in many jurisdictions. . . [has] almost destroyed the traditional respect 
for the bench” (Pound 1937).  The American Bar Association (ABA) was instrumental in 
the development of merit plans in the 1930s and in their adoption in some states 
beginning in the 1940s.  The ABA is also on record as opposing both partisan and 
nonpartisan judicial elections.
11   
The existence of variation in judicial selection over time and across states has led 
to a substantial empirical literature on the effect of judicial selection and retention on 
                                                 
11 “BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association urges state, territorial, and local bar associations 
in jurisdictions where judges are elected in partisan or non-partisan elections to work for the adoption of 
merit selection and retention, and to consider means of improving the judicial elective process.”.” 
www.abanet.org/govaffairs/judiciary/rappd.html   10
outcomes.  Simply put, elections have been associated with receptivity to public desires, a 
perception of impropriety (since the judges must obtain campaign contributions from 
individuals and businesses who may appear before the court), and an overall erosion of 
judicial independence.  Moreover, it seems to be elections themselves that have these 
effects—the difference between partisan and nonpartisan does not appear to be at issue 
(Becker and Reddick 2003). 
If it is true that electing judges leads to a loss of independence, then if a state were 
to change its method of retention from election to some other means (appointed, lifetime 
tenure, or merit retention) then we should see the behavior of judges change in a way that 
would indicate that they are free to decide cases in a way free from punishment.
12  
Moreover, if it was possible to account for all of the conditions across states that 
influence judicial decisions and participation in programs such as the IDEA, then we 
would also expect that judges in states where there have not been elections for some time 
have a stronger tendency to make decisions without regard to broad public sentiment. In 
sum, then, we have two main hypotheses that we will test in this paper: 
Independent Decisions Hypothesis I:  Judges in states that switch their method of 
retaining their judges are more likely to make decisions that protect minority interests 
than they were prior to the switch. 
Independent Decisions Hypothesis II:  All other things being equal, judges in 
states that do not have elections to retain judges during the course of a time period in 
                                                 
12 Again, it is important to note that we are not arguing that judges are ever completely independent.  The 
work on the U.S. Supreme Court, an institution that was specifically designed to promote maximum 
independence, has shown that even these justices are (at least somewhat) receptive to public opinion.  
Rather, we are arguing that moving from an elected system to some other system increases the 
independence of judges.   11
which a law that protects minority interests is being implemented are more likely to 
protect these interests than judges in states that have elections throughout this period. 
 
IV. The Effect of Eliminating Elections on Minority Interests 
Before proceeding, it useful to recall that once out-of-court remedies for resolving 
disputes over the IDEA are exhausted, parents or school districts may go either to a state 
or to a federal court.  At the state level, trial courts are typically the point of entry, and the 
case can go all the way to a state court of last resort.  Since the state court of last resort is 
the last stop in the state system, we use their retention system for coding whether or not 
judges are elected.  And, we use the retention procedures for state trial court judges as a 
robustness check. 
Tables 1A and 1B describe retention procedures for state court of last resort 
judges and state trial judges during 1976-2000.   
(Tables 1A and 1B About Here) 
There are several striking points of comparison.  First, the correlation coefficient for the 
elections of these two kinds of judges is 0.67, so it is likely that a state that elects its court 
of last resort judges any year during 1976-2000 also elects its trial judges.  Second, 19 of 
the 48 continental states always elected their courts of last resort judges, while 27 states 
always elected their trial judges.  And, 24 states always appointed their court of last resort 
judges while only 15 states always appointed their trial judges.  Thus, it appears that 
judicial reform is more prevalent for the court of last resort.  Third, following the 
implementation of IDEA in 1976, five states, including Maryland, New Mexico, New 
York, South Dakota and Tennessee, eliminated elections for their court of last resort   12
judges, and these reforms were never reversed.  While six states eliminated elections of 
trial judges, in the case of South Dakota, this reform lasted for only two years and in the 
case of Illinois, elections replaced appointment procedure in 1984, and then elections 
were eliminated in 1990.  Moreover, for those states that eliminated elections, the average 
period of reform was 16 years for the court of last resort and 10.7 years for trial courts.  
Thus, states have been more successful in eliminating elections for the court of last resort.  
We start our empirical analysis by providing an overview of the relationship 
between procedures for retaining court of last resort judges and the protection of minority 
interests under the IDEA.  We use data on enrollments under the IDEA per student 
population in public primary and secondary schools as our proxy for minority interests.
13  
In 1977, 8.3% of all public school students were enrolled under the IDEA; by 1999 this 
has grown to roughly 13.5%.  Figure 1 portrays enrollment dynamics during 1977-1999 
in two groups of states: those who always appointed their court of last resort judges and 
those who always elected them.  It is clear that enrollments are growing in both groups of 
states, and that enrollments are higher on average in states that always appointed their 
court of last resort judges.  
(Figure 1 About Here) 
Figure 2 illustrates enrollment dynamics for those states that eliminated retention 
elections for their court of last resort judges following the implementation of the IDEA.   
(Figure 2 About Here) 
                                                 
13 Another measure is the number of students who have individual education plans (IEPs).  However, we 
only have this data starting in 1987.  More precisely, we count the state-level enrollment of children with 
disabilities in public schools per student population under IDEA-B and Chapter 1 of ESEA.  In the next 
section we also use IEPs per student at the school district level.  Our data sources are available at the U.S. 
Department of Education and at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/, and in the common core of data at 
http://nces.ed.gov/datatools/index.asp?DataToolSectionID=4.  School district level data summarizing IEPs 
and enrollments and other school district characteristics is available upon request from the Office of Civil 
Rights in the U.S. Department of Education   13
We plot “Years into reform” on the horizontal axis, where 0 is the first year of reform, all 
negative numbers denote years preceding the reform, and all positive numbers denote 
years following the reform.  For purposes of comparison with Figure 1, we employ the 
same scale for enrollments on the vertical axis.  While there are five states that reformed, 
we drop Maryland because it eliminated elections during the first year of the IDEA.  In 
three of the four states, there are sharp rates on enrollment increase following reform, 
while in Tennessee, enrollment growth post-reform is relatively flat.  However, in 
Tennessee, reform is associated with the elimination of the enrollment declines that took 
place in the period before reform.  Figure 3 averages logged enrollment levels for the 
three years preceding reform, the year of reform, and the five years post-reform when 
there is data for all four reform states.  What is striking is that enrollment growth is 
relatively flat before reform, it jumps the year of the reform, and this growth in 
enrollments is subsequently sustained in the next five years.  
(Figure 3 About Here) 
These three figures suggest that our two hypotheses could be valid.  That is, 
Figures 2 and 3 show that minority interests are promoted following the elimination of 
elections (hypothesis 1).  And, Figure 1 suggests that the interests of students with 
disabilities are more vigorously defended in states that always appointed their judges 
during 1976-2000 (hypothesis 2).  Nevertheless, these figures are at best suggestive 
because there are other factors at work that can determine enrollments.  For example, it 
could be the case that states that have an above average population of potentially disabled 
students also tend to appoint their court of last resort judges.  Moreover, there may be 
other factors that explain enrollments in the IDEA including state observables such as   14
preferences for education, preference for welfare spending, standard of living, and other 
measures of the effectiveness of courts or unobserved state effects such as culture.  
Finally, there may be factors such as the enrollment of private industry lawyers that 
simultaneously affect reform and enrollments under the IDEA. 
Our strategy for dealing with these issues when we test the hypothesis that 
eliminating elections is associated with the increased promotion of minority interests is to 
estimate the following statistical model: 
st st t s st REF IDEA ε δ γ α + + + = ln             (1) 
This is a fixed effects model, where s denotes the state;  t = 1977, 1979,…1999 denotes 
an odd numbered year; ln IDEAst denotes logged enrollments of with disabilities in state 
programs under IDEA-B and chapter 1 of ESEA in state s in year t students as a share of 
the total state primary and secondary pubic student population; αs is a state fixed effect 
that capture unobserved factors such as culture; γt  is a national level time effect; and εst  
is a stochastic error term. The term REFst is the post-passage dummy and equals 0 in 
state s in years when there are elections, and equals 1 when elections have been 
eliminated.  Thus, the coefficient δ (post-passage dummy) measures the impact of reform 
on the percentage change in IDEA enrollments.  This coefficient, then, is identified off 
the four states in our sample of 48 states that eliminated elections during 1977-99. 
  In order to obtain a consistent estimate of the impact of eliminating elections, 
reform must be a random treatment.  That is, reform must be an exogenous event, rather 
than being part of a system that is both influenced by other factors that could also 
influence enrollments in the IDEA program including, for example, the balance of power 
between the state judiciary and state legislature, state political culture, or state income.    15
Clearly, reform is not a natural experiment.
14  Since we do not have good sources of 
exogenous variation in reform that have no potential direct influence on enrollments, our 
strategy is to control for observables that can simultaneously influence both reform and 
enrollments.  
Our baseline specification in Table 2 summarizes the model in (1).  The estimated 
effect of reform is statistically significant at the 1% level and its impact is substantial: 
eliminating elections is followed with roughly a 15% increase in enrollments after 
controlling for state fixed effects and national level time effects. 
(Table 2 About Here) 
To account for variables that can affect both reform and enrollments, we include a 
vector of time-varying and state level covariates, denoted Xst and re-estimate (1): 
st st st t s st X REF IDEA ε β δ γ α + + + + = ln           (2) 
In specification (2) Xst contains logged real per capita income and a dummy variable for 
whether or not a state has an intermediate appellate court: this latter variable is a proxy 
for the quality of the state court system.
15  In specifications (3) and (4) we also include 
logged number of private industry lawyers and private practice lawyers per capita as they 
tend to favor a dependent judiciary and may also influence enrollments under the IDEA
16 
(since this data is reported about once every five years, including this variable drastically 
reduces our sample size).  Our results for specifications (2), (3) and (4) are very similar to 
the baseline estimate: in all cases the estimated effect is statistically significant at the 5% 
level and the quantitative effect is surprisingly close to the baseline (almost 15% when 
                                                 
14 We are dealing with what Besley and Case (2003) denote as an “unnatural experiment.” 
15 These courts allow court of last resort to control their dockets and are a standard proxy for sophistication 
of state courts (see, for example, Langer 2002). 
16 We thank Mark Ramseyer for this suggestion.    16
we control for income and intermediate appellate courts, and 15%-16% when we include 
lawyers).  
  In Table 3 we consider four alternative explanations for enrollments, including 
whether a state is pro-education, a state has a strong preference for welfare programs, 
state courts have a record of promoting the equitable provision of public resources, and 
political competition.  The first three alternative explanations are self-explanatory.  
Regarding political competition, Ramseyer (1994) argues that judges can only act 
independently when political competition checks both the ability and the incentives of 
elected officials to interfere with judicial rulings. Hanssen (2004) subsequently shows 
that the U.S. states tend to eliminate elections during periods when political competition 
grows. However, Ramseyer’s analysis (1994) still predicts that, all other factors equal, 
judges are more independent when there is more political competition. 
We use annual deflated (2000=100) state expenditure per capita on education as a  
proxy for whether the state is pro-education and we use annual deflated state spending 
per capita on welfare as a proxy for to check for whether a state is pro- welfare programs.  
In order to capture whether state courts promote equity in education, we use whether or 
not a state court of last resort as of a particular year had ruled against the constitutionality 
of the state school finance system and essentially ordered a reform of the financing 
system.
17  Finally, to measure political competition we use a measure of the extent to 
which a dominant political party controls the upper and lower state legislative houses.
18  
In each case, judicial reform remains significant at the 1% level and its quantitative 
                                                 
17 As noted above, following the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the Rodriguez decision in 1973, the primary 
forum for cases about the financing of education, shifted to state courts. 
18 See Besley and Case (2003). The measure is negative the absolute value of the share of democrats in the 
state house minus 0.5 times the share of democrats in the state senate minus 0.5.This measure is similar to 
the Ranney index.   17
impact in each case is in the 14%-15%, range and is thus close to the impact of reform in 
the baseline specification in Table 2 (we control for per capita income, intermediate 
appellate courts, state fixed effects, and time effects; however, our results also hold when 
we include lawyers).  
(Table 3 About Here) 
  Finally, we have checked whether our results are robust to retention procedures 
for the lower level trial judges.  We have found that this reform has no significant impact.  
This, however, is not surprising since, as previously noted, states have been more 
successful in eliminating elections for the court of last resort judges than for trial judges. 
 
V. The Effect of Always Appointing Judges on Minority Interests 
In this section we test the second hypothesis that all other things being equal, 
judges in states that do not have elections to retain judges during the course of a time 
period in which a law that protects minority interests is being implemented are more 
likely to protect these interests than judges in states that have elections throughout this 
period.  
To do this we use the cross-sectional variation in retention procedures in a year at 
the beginning of the IDEA (1977), mid-reform (1988), and then following the revision of 
the IDEA in 1997 (1998) and use OLS to estimate 
s s s s X REF IDEA ε β δ α + + + = ln     (3) 
Here, as before the vector of controls, Xs, includes logged real per capita income and 
whether or not there are intermediate appellate courts.  However, now the variable REFs 
is 1 for those states that always appointed judges and 0 for those who have always elected   18
their judges during 1976-2000, and the states that changed procedures are excluded.  
Table 4A reports these estimates: it is striking that the use of appointment rather than 
elections is always positively and significantly associated with enrollments in each year, 
and this impact decreases over time from 14.5% in 1997 to roughly 9.0% in 1998.  Table 
4B shows that this result is robust when we use trial court procedures. 
(Tables 4A and 4B About Here) 
  In Table 5A we consider alternative explanations for enrollments that we have 
already considered in Table 3.  The major difference is that to test the importance of 
political competition, we now split the sample between states that are above and less than 
or equal to the median level within state political competition.  It is striking that the 
quantitative impact of an independent judiciary is always strongest at the start of the 
IDEA in 1977.  It is also striking that, with exception of the sub-sample of states in which 
political competition is no greater than the median, the procedure of retaining judges by 
appointment (versus elections) is always statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Regarding political competition, it appears the appointment of court of last resort judges 
is associated with more enrollments only in the set of states in which political 
competition is above the median.  Thus, this is consistent with the theory that political 
competition is necessary for an independent judiciary that protects minority interests even 
when they are not elected.  In Table 5B in the appendix we show that these findings are 
robust when we use trial court procedures. 
(Tables 5A and 5B About Here) 
  Critiques of the IDEA have also argued that allocation of IEPs is less about 
protecting the rights of students with disabilities than it is about allocating resources to   19
the parents of poor students. There is, of course, substantial within state variance in 
poverty.  We use the number of students within school districts who are eligible for free 
lunches (FLEs) at their public schools as a proxy for within-state poverty.
19  If the 
allocation of IEPs is less politicized in states that have an independent judiciary, then we 
would expect that, if there is a positive association between FLEs and IEPs in school 
districts, this gradient will be much steeper in states that elect their judges.  Data on FLEs 
and IEPs at the school district level becomes sufficiently plentiful in 1990.
20 Thus, we 
estimate the following model in 1990 and 1998: 
sd sd sd s
sd s sd sd
X ENRS REF
ENRS FLE REF FLE IEP
ε γ β
β δ δ α
+ +
+ + + + =
ln *
) 3 ( ln ln * ln ln
2
1 2 1  
In (3), lnIEPsd denotes the log of the total individual education plans in district d 
within state s in some year, where the time subscript is suppressed.  Similarly, FLEsd is 
the total number of free lunch eligible students and ENRSsd is the total number of 
enrolled students (graded and ungraded) in the public schools in district d within state s.  
The vector Xsd contains additional controls and εsd is a stochastic error term.  Because 
there are districts that have enrollments and no IEPs, we add one to all of the variables 
before we log them.  
We interact the variables FLEsd and ENRSsd with REFs (the dummy for whether 
or not a state always has appointed its judges during 1976-2000).  Thus, the regressor δ1 
measures the association between FLEs and IEPs in states that always elected their 
judges and δ2 is the differential impact of eliminating elections.  Similarly, the regressor 
β1 measures the association between overall enrollments and IEPs in states that have 
                                                 
19 We thank Nora Gordon for suggesting this measure. 
20 Data sources for FLE and IEPs at the school district level have already been described in footnote 13.   20
always elected their judges, and β2 is the differential impact of never having elections. 
We use this model to check whether is a positive association between IEPs and FLEs and 
whether this gradient is flatter in states in which judges have always been appointed. 
Thus, we test for the null that 1 δ = 0 against the alternative 1 δ  > 0, and we also test for the 
null 0 2 = δ against the alternative 0 2 < δ . Because there are many districts that have no 
IEPs, we censor from the left-hand side at zero using the Tobit procedure. 
Table 6 reports Tobit estimates of equation (4) in 1990 (the first year when there 
is enough data) and 1998 for comparison.   
(Table 6 About Here) 
In specifications (1) and (3) we control for FLEs and enrollments and in (2) and (4) we 
also control for the enrollments of the five monitored ethnic groups.  It is striking that we 
reject the null that  1 δ = 0 and the null that  0 2 = δ  at the 1-percent level in all four 
specifications.  It is also clear that in each specification there is a strong positive 
association between FLEs and IEPs in states that have always elected their judges and 
that this association is weaker in states that appointed their judges.  In 1990, depending 
upon specification, a 10% increase in FLEs is associated with a 2.7% - 2.8% increase in 
IEPs in states that elected their judges, and this association is about 2% in states that have 
always appointed their judges.  By 1998 the same increase in FLEs is associated with a 
2.8%-3.4% increase in IEPs in states that always elected judges, versus roughly 0.7%-
0.9% in states that have always appointed judges.  Thus, while FLEs appears to be an 
important determinant of IEPs, the relation is stronger in states that elect their judges. 
Moreover, the importance for FLEs is quantitatively small in states that have always   21
appointed by 1998.  Table 6A in the appendix shows that these findings are robust to the 
retention procedures for trial court judges 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  Much attention has been paid in the literature to the role that courts have played in 
the financing of education, and just how this has influenced outcome such the distribution 
of educational services and educational outcomes.  However, scholars have to date 
largely ignored the role of the judiciary has played in promoting minority interests.  Here, 
we examined the large increase in enrollments in special education programs after the 
enactment of the IDEA.  Specifically, we asked what explains why enrollments in some 
states have increased dramatically, while in others they have not. 
  The empirical evidence is consistent with our theory that in states where judges 
are more independent, the interests of minorities (in this case, children who qualify for 
IEPs under the IDEA) are better protected.  The data clearly show that minority interests 
are better promoted following the elimination of elections.  Additionally, these interests 
are better protected in states that have always elected their judges (compared to states that 
have always elected their judges).  This conclusion is robust to a variety of alternative 
explanations and specification schemes:  no matter how we look at it, appointed judges 
better protect the interests of minorities. 
  A natural next question is to ask if this finding is limited to the education realm, 
or does it carry over to the protection of other minority interests.  For example, are 
appointed judges more likely to protect the interests of African-Americans in terms of 
racial profiling?  Are appointed judges more likely to protect the interests of homosexuals   22
in adopting children?  Given that the Constitution and Bill of Rights exist to protect the 
rights of minorities, we can think of few questions more important than if certain 
institutional arrangements promote the protection of these rights. 
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Table 1A: Retention of Court of Last Judges, 1976-2000 
States that eliminated partisan and non-partisan elections 
 
Maryland                               1976 
New  York      1979 
New  Mexico    1989 
South  Dakota    1981 
Tennessee      1995     
States that have always elected their judges  
 
Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, 
Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
States that have never elected their judges 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina,  Utah, Vermont, 
Virginia, Wyoming 
 
Table 1B: Retention of Trial Judges, 1976-2000 
States that eliminated partisan and non-partisan elections 
 
Arizona                                  1984 
Illinois                  1976-93, there are no elections;  
                                                1984-89, elections are introduced; 
                                                1990, elections are eliminated 
Kansas      1984 
New  Mexico    1990 
South Dakota     1982-83, elections are eliminated; 
                  1984, elections are re-instated 
Utah                                        1990 
States that have always elected their judges  
 
Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin 
States that have never elected their judges 
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, 
Virginia, Wyoming 
 
Sources: The Book of the States, various years and 
http://www.ajs.org/js/select.htm   24
 
Table 2: Judicial Reform and the IDEA, 1977-99 
 
Dependent Variable is the logged enrollment of children with disabilities in public 















Controls; state fixed 










Additional Controls; real 












Private industry lawyers 









Private practice lawyers 
per capita (logged) 
No No No  Yes 
Number of observations  576  576  240  240 
Adjusted R
2  0.836 0.837 0.827  0.828 
 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity corrected, and ***, ** and * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  This convention is used in subsequent tables. 
Because retention procedures are reported bi-annually, we use observations for every odd 
year during 1977-99.   25
Table 3: Alternative Explanations for Implementation in the IDEA, 
1977-99 
 
Dependent Variable is the logged enrollment of children with disabilities in public 
schools per student population under IDEA-B and Chapter 1of ESEA 
 
























Real state spending on 




   
Real state spending on 





Highest state court 
orders a revision of state 
school finance system 






    -9.1% 
(15.7%) 
Number of observations  576  576  576  576 
Adjusted R
2  0.840 0.837 0.838 0.837 
 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity corrected.  Because retention procedures are 
reported bi-annually, we use observations for every odd year during 1977-99.  In each 
specification we control for state fixed effects, national time effects, real per capita 
income (logged) and intermediate appellate courts. All of the reported results hold when 
we control for either private industry lawyers or private practice lawyers per capita.   26
Table 4A: Judicial Reform and the IDEA Enrollments in 1977, 1988 and 1998 
Court of Last Resort Judges 
 
Dependent Variable is the logged enrollment of children with disabilities in public 
schools per student population under IDEA-B and Chapter 1of ESEA 
 
 



























2  0.215 0.200 0.150 
 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity corrected.  There are 43 observations in 
each regression because states that change their retention procedures during 1976-2000 
are eliminated.   
 
Table 4B: Trial Judges 
 



























2  0.207 0.254 0.180 
 
Notes: Standard errors are heteroskedasticity corrected.  There are 42 observations in 
each regression because states that change their retention procedures during 1976-2000 
are eliminated.    27
Table 5: Alternative Explanations for the the IDEA Enrollments in 
1977, 1988 and 1998 
 
Court of Last Resort Judges 
 
Year  1977 1988 1998 









Log Private Industry 








2  0.354 0.248 0.211 









Highest state court 
orders a revision of 









2  0.230 0.200 0.159 









Real state spending on 









2  0.236 0.203 0.150 









Real state spending on 









2  0.233 0.212 0.153 
Explanation  Political competition is critical for an independent judiciary 
(sample split by political competition) 
Appointed judges in 








2 (Observations)  0.303 (22)  0.429 (21)  0.389 (22) 
Appointed judges 
states less than or 
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Table 6: Alternative Explanation of IEPs in 1990 and 1998: 
School District Poverty Matters  
 
Court of Last Resort Judges 
 
Dependent Variable Is Individual Education Plans for School Districts, logged 
 
Year 1990 1998 
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Students 
Receiving Free 











































Controls for the 
five ethnic groups  No Yes No  Yes 
Censored IEP 
observations at 
IEP = 0 




4,621 4,621 9,112  9,112 
Pseudo R square 
  0.280 0.285 0.357  0.377 
Log Likelihood 
  -8,346.4 -8,293.9  -12,782.5  -12,391.3 
 
Notes to Table 5: In the first four explanations, there are 43 observations in each regression 
because we eliminate states that change their retention procedures during 1976-2000. In the case 
of political competition, there are 42 observations overall because Nebraska, which has a 
unicameral state legislature, is not measured. In each regression we also control for log real per 
capita income and intermediate appellate courts. 
 
Notes to Table 6: We eliminate states that change their retention procedures during 1976-2000 
Results are based on the estimation using the Tobit procedure. The dependent variable, individual 
education plans (IEP), is censored from the left at zero. We also censor the IEPs per students 
enrolled in the school district from the right at the 95
th percentile to eliminate what we believe is a 
reporting error, i.e., school districts where student enrollments are less than or only marginally 
greater than the number of IEPs. Judicial reform is a dummy variable equal to 1 for states that do 
not elect, and 0 for states that elect judges in retention elections.   




Figure 1: Enrollments in States that Do Not Change Retention 
Procedures
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Figure 2: Judicial Reform and Enrollments Under the IDEA 
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Notes: The minimum and maximum for the vertical axis in Figures 1 and 2 is the same (min is -3.0 and 





Figure 3: Enrollments under the IDEA for the Average Reformer
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Appendix 
 
Table 5A: Alternative Explanations for the IDEA Enrollments 
Trial Judges 
Year  1977 1988 1998 









Log Private Industry 








2  0.314 0.273 0.233 









Highest state court 
orders a revision of 









2  0.207 0.375 0.191 









Real state spending on 









2  0.208 0.257 0.185 









Real state spending on 









2  0.207 0.263 0.210 
Explanation  Political competition is critical for an independent judiciary 
(sample split by political competition) 
Appointed judges in 








2 (Observations)  0.343 (19)  0.490 (19)  0.400 (22) 
Appointed judges 
states less than or 








2 (Observations)  0.241 (22)  0.140 (22)  0.252 (19) 
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Table 6A Poverty Matters for IEPs in 1990 and 1998: 
Trial Judges  
 
Dependent Variable Is Individual Education Plans for School Districts, logged 
 
Year 1990 1998 
Specification  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
Students 
Receiving Free 











































Controls for the 
five ethnic groups  No Yes No  Yes 
Censored IEP 
observations at 
IEP = 0 




4,621 4,621 9,112  9,112 
Pseudo R square 
  0.319 0.326 0.360  0.378 
Log Likelihood 
  -7,896.6 -7,812.7  -12,731.5  -12,360.6 
 
Notes to Table 5A: There are 42 observations in each regression because states that change their 
retention procedures during 1976-2000 are eliminated. In the case of political competition, we 
also drop Nebraska. In each regression we also control for log real per capita income and 
intermediate appellate courts. 
 
Notes to Table 6A: We eliminate states that change their retention procedures during 1976-
2000 Results are based on the estimation using the Tobit procedure. The dependent variable, 
individual education plans (IEP), is censored from the left at zero. We also censor the IEPs per 
students enrolled in the school district from the right at the 95
th percentile to eliminate what we 
believe is a reporting error, i.e., school districts where student enrollments are less than or only 
marginally greater than the number of IEPs. Judicial reform is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
states that do not elect, and 0 for states that elect judges in retention elections.   
 
 